“Pop Gingle’s Cold War in Hong Kong”

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Abstract: During its first century as a colonial entrepôt (1841-1941), Hong Kong was defined by free trade imperialism and global interconnection. Founded to anchor the opium trade between British India and Qing China, Hong Kong emerged in the late nineteenth century as the principal hub of overseas Chinese migration to and from North America and Southeast Asia. The Second World War’s brutal Japanese occupation and the Cold War seemed to spell doom for Hong Kong’s future as a center of mobility and exchange, however. The unraveling of European Asian empires, the rise in regional anti-Chinese nationalisms, and the collapse in U.S.-China relations all undermined the established commercial networks passing through the territory. In reality, Hong Kong’s fraught continuation as a Crown colony allowed it to persist as a node of unique and overlapping political possibilities and economic interactions. This article investigates early Cold War Hong Kong as an interstitial node of contested sovereignties and loyalties through the shifty figure of American restaurateur “Pop” Gingle. A charismatic and shrewd opportunist, Gingle deployed mounting U.S. regional influence as cover over his non-aligned personal empire of patronage, money, and information.

I. Introduction

Hong Kong was a bellwether in the twentieth-century Pacific’s realignments of power. From a bastion of British naval supremacy, the colony fell to a stunning Japanese conquest on Christmas Day 1941—the first British colony surrendered since Cornwallis at Yorktown in 1781. Hong Kong’s 1945 restoration to British rule required U.S. support, as well as tacit Nationalist and later Communist consent. Between 1945 and 1951, the colony received the Cold War’s largest influx of anticommunist refugees. Simultaneously, the People’s Republic of China’s (P.R.C.) entry into the Korean War prompted Washington to retaliate with a blanket trade embargo and remittance ban in December 1950. Backed by the United Nations, this embargo truncated Hong Kong’s traditional economic foundation: entrepôt trade and remittance banking. The embargo pivoted the city toward U.S.-dominated global capitalism in the form of low-wage, export-driven manufacturing. The colony nonetheless remained dependent on P.R.C. food and water supplies, garnering Mao much of
his foreign exchange earnings and creating taut economic co-dependencies between Hong Kong and the mainland that lasted for decades.

As Chi-kwan Mark analyzes, these early Cold War events unfolded alongside waning British imperial power, on-going Chinese civil war politics, and U.S. imperial expansion under the formula of “containment.” Postwar austerity forced London to shrink the colony’s garrison, predicking Hong Kong’s future on P.R.C. goodwill and vague U.S. backing. As a result, colonial officials navigated a complex relationship between local needs, Beijing, and Washington. They sought to cope with the refugee crisis with minimal expenditure and minimal embarrassment to themselves and Beijing. They pursued secret U.S. defense commitments and welcomed U.S. Seventh Fleet sailors’ use of Hong Kong for rest and recreation (R&R), but parried the U.S. embargo’s mandates and restrained anti-Beijing provocations. Mao’s agents mined the colony’s information and exchange networks, while P.R.C. mouthpieces continually asserted Chinese sovereignty and ranted against U.S. or Taipei activities. And while Hong Kong was itself “a peripheral factor in U.S. global considerations,”⁴ Washington eagerly sought to capitalize on the unique opportunities Hong Kong offered on Mao’s doorstep. The Eisenhower administration leveraged defense aid as “a bargaining chip” in exchange for conducting anti-Beijing trade, propaganda, and espionage campaigns in the colony. The U.S. Embassy remained in Taipei until 1979, but the Hong Kong Consulate emerged as one of the world’s largest legations to handle massive immigration and intelligence responsibilities. Local C.I.A. and U.S.I.S. activities also grew exponentially. On the ground in Hong Kong, the result was a constantly shifting terrain of advance and retreat between reserved British oversight, communist and Nationalist Chinese agitations, and American imperial expansion. Alongside Berlin, Hong Kong was the exceptional Cold War locale where so many contending agendas rubbed shoulders on a daily basis.
While scholars extensively study state-based Cold War diplomacy and espionage, they pay less attention to how non-state actors and even individuals deploy and complement states’ power. That deployment is especially important in key nodes such as Hong Kong where complications of sovereignty collided with contending imperial agendas. These Cold War reconfigurations of power opened abundant opportunities for non-state actors to interpret, collaborate with, and subvert the Chinese, British, and American agendas in Hong Kong. Edward Francis Gingle is a powerful case for this point precisely because he was not an elite “great man.” This ex-U.S. Navy seaman and Wisconsin native operated a hotel and series of popular restaurants in Hong Kong from 1937 until his death in the British colony in 1960. He was a conspicuous character at over 300 pounds, bald, and cane-bound. He inspired writer Ernest Gann’s 1954 novel Soldier of Fortune, which became a 1955 Hollywood film starring Clark Gable. He was further mythologized during his life and in obituaries as “one of the best known personalities in Hongkong.” In reality, Gingle was a shifty figure and fabulist. Beneath an improbable exterior, Gingle was a shrewd broker of transpacific flows of people, information, and money for which Hong Kong was the essential node.

Amidst the political divisions partitioning East and Southeast Asia, the Anglo-Chinese territory remained a site of contested authority positioned at the center of Cold War competitions. From this interstitial platform, Gingle loudly marketed his restaurant as an outpost of American hospitality catering to ordinary Joes. This branding played to sentimental 1950s “Cold War Orientalism,” enabled his acclaim as Hong Kong’s host of Allied servicemen, and masked his rise as an illicit intelligence source and, according to Gann, as “one of the known agents through whom Chinese in America sent funds to relatives behind the Bamboo Curtain.” His restaurant’s flag-waving patriotism was thus an astute commercial tactic that deployed U.S. prestige as camouflage over a restaurant doubling as a transnational information bazaar. Gingle cultivated a forum in which Allied servicemen parlayed with Chinese staff and customers, as well as international journalists,
diplomats, and businessmen. Through this simple venue, Gingle siphoned profits from the U.S. military, monitored the region’s developments, dissuaded colonial interference, and flouted U.S. and P.R.C. remittance prohibitions. U.S. Asian empire was not just about Generals MacArthur or Westmoreland. It was also about Gingle and tens of thousands of private U.S. citizens able to exploit new opportunities under Washington’s expanding umbrella in the western Pacific. Simultaneously, Gingle’s particular skills, resources, and connections enabled him to carve mercenary opportunities from multiple empires’ ambitions and fragilities. He fed off of British, U.S., and Chinese competitions and built his own non-aligned domain in this colonial interstitial space through personal networks, valuable information, and sheer force of personality. His stationary enterprise checked imperial supervision and brokered diverse American and Chinese movements. His success highlights Hong Kong’s intersectionality and the limitations of empires’ designs to control contact between the communist and capitalist worlds.8

II. Pop Gingle’s Cold War

Before the Japanese invasion of Hong Kong, colonial glass ceilings circumscribed Pop Gingle’s ambitions. In particular, his interracial marriage barred him from translating professional achievement into social success. He was inconsistent about his early life, reporting various years of birth and Wisconsin hometowns.9 He served in the U.S. East Asia fleet from the 1920s and began a sexual relationship with younger Hong Kong woman Kwok Sai So (郭細蘇). As his second wife, she was known as Susan Gingle. Kwok gave birth to their only daughter Mabel between April 1926 and May 1927.10 Gingle was resident in Hong Kong by May 1937, when he purchased half of the Palace Hotel in Tsim Sha Tsui. He likely used capital accumulated during his U.S. Navy service or borrowed against his lifetime annuity.11 After getting “the damn hotel organized,”12 Gingle opened four American-style diners that “startled” the colony’s taste buds.13 He recruited fellow Americans into his operation, including partner Chester Bennett and hotel manager Ernest “Red” Sammons,
another veteran. Yet, despite such rapid success, Gingle joined no social clubs and the English-language press never mentioned him. He remained on the Common Jurors List throughout 1938-1941. U.S. publications too never interviewed him before the war. These absences offer decisive contrast with his later Cold War popularity. His nationality was not the barrier. By marrying a Cantonese woman, Gingle had violated one of the colony’s clearest prewar social conventions and the laws of many U.S. states. Interracial sex was common, but marriages between individuals perceived as “white” and Chinese, Eurasians, or Portuguese produced social ostracism and even professional termination. Indeed, in Hong Kong, Chinese remained barred from the senior civil service, most elite social clubs, General Chamber of Commerce membership, admission to the Matilda Hospital, and even first-class Star Ferry seats. Gingle was living in a British colonial world whose racial segregations he had transgressed.

The Pacific War upended these exclusions and indelibly transformed perceptions of Gingle’s family, networks, and reputation. These changes were dramatized at the Japanese internment camp at Stanley. 2,500 British, 350 Americans, and 70 Dutch went into this makeshift prison on Hong Kong Island’s southern tip in January 1942. Upon his family’s arrival, Gingle commandeered a position of great power. Journalist Gwen Dew recorded that “Food-preparation was immediately taken over by Gingles, an ex-navy man who had had restaurants in Hong Kong for years.” With his experience, “he could get better results with the rice, and pull tricks with the small amounts of extras.” In a perilous situation of meager daily rations, a skilled food purveyor summited the social pyramid. Gingle’s cooking did not just deliver nutrition, however. It powerfully preserved national honor amidst war’s uncertainties. While many British prisoners still resisted eating rice, Gingle’s “genius” shielded Americans. Journalist Richard Wilson declared: “Since we had no flour, Ed took a coffee grinder and pulverized dried rice. With this he’d make pancakes, muffins and, last Easter, two doughnuts for every American child in camp.” Gingle’s inventiveness maximized resources and
comforted internees. Moreover, Gingle’s trusted Cantonese guanxi (connections) were essential to this project. Through his once snubbed wife and business, Gingle had extensive local contacts. He mined these networks to smuggle additional food into the American camp: “He was such a good cook and used his contacts with the Chinese so well that he saved us all from beri-beri, even though it was common, in the British concentration camp.”21 In harrowing straits, the power of Gingle’s localized roots became undeniable. His ingenuity seized on this change and steered a new pathway to position and prestige.

Gingle’s decision to forego repatriation crystallizes his realization that the war had transformed the local socio-political terrain. Most Stanley Americans were repatriated through a prisoner exchange in June 1942. It speaks volumes—as it did to contemporary observers—that Washington was able to repatriate its Stanley internees while Britain could not. Missionary Father Smith reported: “the British are still incredulous about repatriation of the Americans.”22 Gingle elected to remain though, purportedly to cook for the missionaries. In reality, he had no such intention and signed release papers on August 5, 1942.23 This decision’s significance cannot be emphasized enough. Missionaries stayed from spiritual calling, but his incentives as a restaurateur and hotelier are at first baffling. He elected a brutal occupation over returning to the United States. Washington’s discriminatory immigration policies and racist definitions of citizenship might have impeded his family’s return, but many non-American wives of Stanley repatriates were rescued.24 Moreover, both Sammons and Bennett also chose not to repatriate from Stanley.25 Gingle’s family and partners rooted him in Hong Kong and lent him networks that changed his worldview. His coterie took their chances in occupied Hong Kong—neither repatriating nor collaborating by relying on Chinese networks.26 He re-entered Hong Kong with honed expertise in seizing opportunities outside state sanction and with solidified commitment to this nexus. He never returned to the United States. The reconfigurations of political and economic power that redefined Hong Kong
after 1945 and 1949 opened numerous public and illicit business opportunities for an established broker such as Gingle. Numerous people in Hong Kong, Britain, and the United States owed him great debts from internment.\textsuperscript{27} He was associated publicly with local heroes such as Bennett, who the Japanese beheaded in May 1943 for spying and smuggling.\textsuperscript{28} And Gingle was an American in a colony where British prestige had nosedived. Indeed, Britain needed U.S. backing to retake Hong Kong and these power shifts created new opportunities in East Asia for U.S. citizens.\textsuperscript{29} Robert Bickers highlights that British power in treaty port China relied on the opportunities it provided to ordinary citizens, not just high officials.\textsuperscript{30} The same holds true for Washington’s Cold War Asian empire and ordinary Americans. These opportunities were not confined to aligned protectorates, but extended into areas under increasing U.S. sway such as Hong Kong and its melee of competing state agendas. Finally, the blacklist from Gingle’s interracial marriage now increasingly lifted. While leading local British firms such as Jardine’s and Swire’s forbade interracial marriage among white male employees into the 1970s,\textsuperscript{31} U.S. imperial needs carved new options for Americans. 1946 and 1947 amendments to the War Brides Act first permitted non-quota entry for Asian war brides and sanctioned mixed race marriages before courts struck down anti-miscegenation laws. In addition, Naoko Shibusawa highlights that mainstream U.S. cultural ideologies of gender and maturity now reimagined allied Asian peoples as feminine and childlike—naturalizing U.S. leadership.\textsuperscript{32} Over the first postwar decade, these perspectives combined with the extensive U.S. military presence in East Asia to endorse interracial marriages between Euro-American males and Asian females.\textsuperscript{33} Hong Kong American elites such as First National City Bank executive Henry Sperry joined in breaking these barriers, marrying tycoon Hysan Lee’s daughter Ansie in 1946.\textsuperscript{34} These shifts retroactively blessed the Gingles’ union and allowed him to perfect the role he adopted at Stanley: the Allies’ ex-military godfather-in-chief.
Although astute, Gingle’s commercial opportunities were plain to see. In late 1945 and 1946, the colony was awash in British, American, and Nationalist troops. One Chinese resident asked facetiously in the *South China Morning Post*: “Is this Colony at present British, Chinese or American?” For the first time, American GIs appeared regularly on the streets and in the press. And no resident could have missed sights such as U.S. Task Force 77 departing the colony on May 6, 1946. As if re-enacting the famed flyover of B-29s at the Japanese surrender, fifty U.S. warplanes flew V-formations across Hong Kong while U.S. ships fired multiple twenty-one-gun salutes.

Among these tides of servicemen, Hong Kong was a particularly meaningful port of call for the more than 16,000 Chinese Americans who served in World War II. Numerous Chinese American veterans came to Hong Kong after the war in search of work. The colony also remained the best juncture for Chinese Americans to access family in Guangdong. As China’s civil war resumed, Chinese American veterans figured repeatedly in the press for attempting to smuggle arms and gold through Hong Kong to their native places. U.S. servicemen of Chinese descent also confused local law enforcement that were unfamiliar with this demographic. Finally, Hong Kong was where many Chinese American servicemen sought wives while non-quota entry was possible. Hong Kong’s then all-time record for marriages in one day occurred on November 21, 1947. That record stemmed from “Chinese-American ex-servicemen, desiring to play safe on the interpretation” of the War Brides Acts. Since Chinese brides of U.S. servicemen needed to enter the United States before December 31, “Chinese American ex-servicemen are… coming out to wed their fiancées before New Year’s Eve.” 1948 figures confirm that the record 3,600 Chinese admitted that year were “a majority of Chinese wives of American Chinese citizens.”

Gingle tailored his renewed business as the obvious connection point for all these British and U.S. military visitors of Chinese and European descent. Indeed, Gingle commenced a campaign to become the godfather to every Allied serviceman in the region. Rather than revive his scattered
holdings, he worked more efficiently and re-opened just one establishment, Gingle’s Annexe at 70 Nathan Road near his former hotel, leveled by U.S. bombs. Now, whether servicemen sought tastes of home, employment tips, assistance running items to mainland relations, or just bachelor party drinks, the rapidly re-branded “Gingle’s” was one-stop shopping in a postwar city with limited drinking and Euro-American dining options. It was among the colony’s first establishments to acquire a postwar liquor license and among just thirteen to renew it in May 1946, with Sammons the responsible party. 

Susan Gingle again proved essential, as an American reporter noted: “Pop’s Chinese wife, Susie, put the show back on the road after they were released from internment and their present establishment, on one of Kowloon’s busiest streets, is a tribute to her managing of business matters.” Gingle’s was more than just servicemen’s favored restaurant. When police arrested U.S. sailors for smuggling whiskey into a ballroom, they “admitted buying the liquor from Gingle’s.” Visiting servicemen knew exactly where to find welcome and begin diverse Hong Kong quests.

Gingle’s boundless generosity toward servicemen and other U.S. agents was an essential draw for his revived restaurant’s public and illicit dealings. When the U.S.S. Eldorado visited, Gingle faithfully “rassle[d] his 300 pounds around as official bat boy for the lads while they played teams from the Hong Kong garrison.” Moreover, he “gained near immortality when he produced cold beer for all hands at every game.” This bounty was not restricted by nationality. When the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders returned from Korea, they “mobbed the restaurant…Pop broke out Australian T-bone steaks for all the soldiers…Plus free cold beer, ‘until it ran outta their ears.’” Gingle was not concerned about formal enlistment: “Pilots, particularly, have him in high regard, since Pop has been known to stake many a ‘grounded’ airman until things picked up again.” A Wisconsin paper boasted Gingle’s loans and generosity made the restaurant the “natural spot for CAT flyers to congregate.”

Civil Air Transport (C.A.T.) was an airline founded by General Claire
Chennault and secretly owned and directed by the C.I.A. One obituary later affirmed his “cheery disposition and his kindness to people of all walks of life” made his restaurant “to expatriate Americans especially…more than a restaurant—it was a home, a club, an official post restaunte [sic].”

The liberality that Gingle learned during internment remained highly politically strategic. Regularly doling out loans, free beer, and complimentary steak to thousands of servicemen and C.A.T. pilots would seem ruinous fiscal choices for a restaurant. In reality, this tactic was his chosen method of advertising both his culinary and off-menu specialties. You would search in vain for a single newspaper ad for his establishments. Word of mouth was the way to capture Gingle’s desired customer base: a mobile diaspora of circulating military personnel scattered across the region’s swelling number of U.S. imperial bases, ships, and airports. In addition, a reputation for reliable munificence ensured a steady stream of favor seekers. Local and visiting servicemen made it a priority to visit and to build a relationship with its proprietor. Chinese American servicemen had particular incentives to stop in: burnishing their image as fully “American” while potentially broaching the Gingles’ assistance in funneling aid to mainland relatives. Finally, Gingle’s brutal wartime experiences had internalized food and drink’s power to accumulate debts and information. He declared of the Highlanders: “‘That’s my regiment… and I’m going to feed them some real good old American cooking when they get back. I’ll cut the steaks myself.’” More than filling his tables, Gingle was recruiting specific free-spending customers, their trust, and their open conversation. He was one of the best-informed civilians in Asia about naval and troop movements. According to The Saturday Evening Post, “‘Gingle was C.A.T.’s father confessor, bibulous companion and banker.’”

In addition to generosity, Gingle endowed his restaurant with a second notorious asset: high-octane American patriotism that seized a niche market and discouraged doubts about his loyalties. Pop intensified his prewar restaurants’ image to deliver a version of 1950s U.S. culture that thrilled
locals and kept homesick servicemen coming back. U.S. military power coincided with global interest in the energy and abundance of American consumerism, symbolized by rock n’ roll, Hollywood, and the automobile. Collier’s Weekly enthusiastically informed home audiences that this American brand was thriving in Hong Kong under Gingle’s guidance: “Pop’s comfortable establishment in Kowloon is as American as a short-order drive-in on U.S. 1,” complete with “a picture of Custer’s Last Stand, and a juke box… loaded with the latest in Stateside hillbilly and swing records.” Gingle’s forum was urban Hong Kong’s version of a blaring drive-in. The Custer image likely resonated positively with Gingle’s uniformed base, projecting defiant U.S. military bravado mere miles from the supposedly vast hordes of evil “Red China.” This restaurant was more than a hub of Americana. It was a roaring, red-blooded diner-meets-saloon and a muscular statement of rising U.S. power within one fading empire and on the doorstep of another. His four prewar restaurants had “startled” the colony, but now just one made him a notorious national and local landmark.

Gingle never again left Hong Kong, but his reputation traversed the Pacific through state-supported networks of circulating servicemen. As Shibusawa argues for U.S.-occupied Japan, overseas Americans were “particularly important” to the rapid transformation in domestic views of Japan through reports, articles, travelogues, and published memoirs. Enlisted and civilian Americans were also reporting on Hong Kong. By the mid-1950s Americans comprised the colony’s largest source of tourists and these visitors thrilled at Hong Kong’s “exotic” sites while embracing the red carpet welcome at Gingle’s. This seemingly all-American restaurateur piqued the attention of publications at the imperial heart—and appeared in LIFE, Collier’s Weekly, The Saturday Evening Post, American Aviation, and local newspapers. Their collective interest in this “Fabulous Character in [the] Far East” reflected the Cold War appetites of an American public newly concerned with Asia. It was Gingle’s ideal moment. U.S. interviews eagerly celebrated his persona of an ordinary wanderer
thriving in the mysterious ‘East’ in order to proclaim a corner of Hong Kong. Gingle’s 1937 acquisition of the Palace Hotel was reimagined as a “celebration of such caliber that old-time residents of Hong Kong began dating subsequent local events from that evening.” Another marveled that Gingle’s reputation stretched “to the four corners of the world” while in Hong Kong one needed only “stop any ricksha [sic] boy or taxi driver in this tropical community and shout no more than ‘Gingle’s!’ at him.” Considerable national pride infuses this supposedly average Joe’s success and the overseas expansion of American culture. The message to domestic imperial audiences is one of natural, uncalculated U.S. prestige “out there” in the world. *American Aviation* fawned: “He is one of Hong Kong’s most popular figures, gives about everything he earns to charity, and gives all of the leftover food to the poor. He…is one of those truly generous human characters.”

While peddling these fabrications, these McCarthy-era publications glossed over clear evidence that Gingle was a rogue figure. These seductively sugary interviews testify that Gingle possessed vast contacts among his restaurant’s “world travelers” and imperial hierarchies. Bill Stapleton noted Gingle’s personal relationships with both Vice-Admiral Milton Miles, former head of Naval Intelligence and O.S.S. operations in China, and Vice-Admiral Oscar Badger, Commander of U.S. Naval Forces in the Western Pacific. Gingle scoffed of Badger: “‘Knew him when he was a damn’ ensign.’” Gingle cultivated figures such as pilot James McGovern, Jr.—supposedly dubbed “Earthquake McGoon” by Gingle. McGovern flew for C.A.T. before leading a contingent of U.S. pilots in support of the French in Vietnam and dying at Dienbienphu in 1954. *LIFE* covered McGovern’s funeral with just one photograph: “good friend” Gingle. Gingle extended his munificence to U.S. business interests. In 1947, Pennsylvania’s Hammond Iron Works sent an engineer team to install steel storage tanks for a local industrial concern. When the crew departed, they feted Gingle and presented him with “a silver replica of a tank” as thanks “for the kindly
manner in which he had looked after the boys and for the attention and service given during the ‘Gang’s’ stay in Hongkong.” Beyond generosity, this behavior was insistent patronage designed to amass extensive debts and ensure Gingle as a regional power broker. As Stapleton carelessly noted: “Pop gets a tremendous kick out of the idea that his name has become a byword in such places as Tokyo, Singapore, Calcutta, the Fiji’s and even barren Shemya in the Aleutians.”

This transnational repute for generosity and dexterity led writer Ernest Gann to Gingle. His account provides a more complex view of Hong Kong’s possibilities as an interstitial space and of Gingle as a broker moving between worlds and profiting from the lack of control by any would-be authorities. Gann sought material for a new novel. He recounts in his 1978 memoir that his interest in Gingle surged upon hearing of his remittance dealings and that “Gingles was the most valuable contact Naval Intelligence had in Hong Kong.” A former Nationalist officer arranged the meeting and Gann’s account is arresting. He should have been an ideal figure to experience Gingle’s hospitality. Gann was from the Midwest, a former Air Force and commercial pilot, and a passionate sailor—all Gingle’s specialties. Instead, the figure he describes was “the composite of all the devious and dangerous characters who populated Grade B melodramas – ‘Surely,’ I whispered to myself, ‘Sydney Greenstreet in the flesh.’” When Gann inquired whether Gingle could find a junk from which he could paint the waterfront, he recalled a striking reply: “‘Bullshit,’ Gingles said flatly. ‘You work for the U.S. government.’” Despite Gann’s denial, Gingle purportedly launched a tirade:

“What gives any of the U.S. government agencies the idea they can send some guy like you over here to check up on Gingles? This is British territory and you people can’t do a goddamned thing about anything. Now you go back to Washington or wherever in the hell you came from and tell them that. Tell them they can goddamn well leave Gingles alone.”
Gingle terminated their meeting and later threatened Gann to leave Hong Kong on a Pan American flight to Manila: “‘You better be on it. There’s a ticket at the airport in your name. I say again if you like your good health be on that airplane.’”\(^{65}\) Gann claimed he went to Hong Kong police, where officer Chelsey Debbs replied: “‘Of course we’ve known Gingles for years, although generally he keeps shy of us and we have no reason for direct contact.’”\(^{66}\) Gann inquired whether Gingle’s threat was genuine and Debbs responded, “‘Quite.’”\(^ {67}\)

Gann’s account is rich, but credible. Although a novelist writing years later, his descriptions of Gingle’s speech, physicality, and restaurant match other accounts. He did not hesitate to use other parties’ full names. While approximating the quotes and drama, Gann is convincing that Gingle was a guarded figure well known to both British and U.S. authorities. British officials looked the other way, manifesting their “diplomacy of restraint” regarding U.S. actions in Hong Kong.\(^{68}\)

Washington’s Cold Warriors attempted to ‘check up’ on Gingle but could not ‘do a goddamned thing’ so long as he remained in the colony. Moreover, Gingle was intermittently useful to U.S. intelligence. Instead of the patriot conjured for home audiences, Gann found a non-aligned boss in command of networks, information, and threats. Gann’s depiction is eerily similar to a “Hong Kong American Gangster” denounced by *Wen Wei Po* in May 1957.\(^{69}\) The leftist paper said that “when Clark Gable came to Hong Kong to shoot ‘Soldier of Fortune,’”\(^{70}\) locals found absurd its storyline of a U.S. gangster in Hong Kong. Now, the storyline seemed credible in light of an unnamed individual “involved in the local catering industry” that it accused of investing in prostitution. Without naming its subject, the article testifies that at least one Hong Kong American’s culinary enterprise was serving more than food.

Gingle had the key advantage of timing to deal in remittances. Since the California Gold Rush, North American Chinese remittances (*qiaobui*) had been a major source of income for both dependent Guangdong families (*qiaojuan*) and for Hong Kong brokers.\(^ {71}\) In particular, the colony’s
“Gold Mountain Firms” (jinshanzhuang) had thrived on California remittances, as well as the migration and commodity trades. These firms remained the principal conduit for this trade into the early 1950s. The People’s Republic’s transition to socialism, the Korean War, and the ensuing 1950 U.S. embargo seismically disrupted their business, however. In 1951, the U.S. Treasury heightened enforcement of this remittance ban after press reports of P.R.C. officials holding Chinese Americans’ relatives for ransom by remittances. These actions cast mainstream doubt on Chinese Americans’ political loyalty and further shuttered Hong Kong’s remittance business. Hong Kong’s newspapers detailed the crippling of these longstanding pathways, the jinshanzhuang’s plight, and their trade association’s lobbying. Pro-Nationalist newspaper Kong Sheung Yat Po stated that U.S. actions had been “a big blow to Hong Kong’s specialized handlers of mainland remittances, trading firms, and private banks.” These established houses could no longer accept remittances without risking harsh U.S. penalties. Thus, this lucrative industry had a critical vacuum as Gingle’s transnational reputation soared in the early 1950s. Moreover, as Kong Sheung pointed out, Chinese Americans could still legally send money to Hong Kong businesses and relatives, who might somehow transmit the money “in disguise.” A flag-waving U.S. veteran and servicemen’s host with a well-known location, extensive connections, and smuggling experience fit the bill as an unexpected yet easy-to-find agent for this imperiled commerce. And Gingle had never refused opportunities based on states’ dictates.

While Gann’s testimony remains the most solid evidence that Gingle dealt in remittances, the restaurateur was ideally positioned to. He had trusted Cantonese family, friends, and employees who could cross into Guangdong. As discussed, he also labored assiduously to place high and low officials throughout British and U.S. imperial networks in his debt. With his flamboyant patriotism as camouflage, favors and character witnesses would have been plentiful. Hong Kong also received extensive food imports from China throughout the Cold War—and Gingle was a highly skilled operator when it came to the acquisition and transportation of food. He successfully smuggled food
and information in and out of Stanley’s far more challenging confines. Finally, it is salient that Gingle’s country retreat “Sunnybrook Farm” in the New Territories village of Ku Tong was a few thousand feet from the Lo Wu boundary and on a creek flowing directly across the border. He had an arsenal of exceptional resources through which to funnel items, messages, and currency across that porous membrane, the “Bamboo Curtain.”

III. Conclusion

When Gingle died of nephritis at Sunnybrook on June 20, 1960, he left a comfortable estate to his widow and daughter. He lost most of his possessions during the war, but in the subsequent fifteen years he rebuilt a successful restaurant and acquired both an urban residence and considerable property in the agricultural New Territories—while freely dispensing loans, beer, and steak to his recruited followers. Valued in 1960 at HK$288,000, today the estate would be worth at least U.S.$500,000-$1 million. Susan and Mabel Gingle were thus secure and dissolved Gingle’s, Ltd. in 1962 and moved to 510 Nathan Road. Red Sammons and his wife Minnie Chan Sammons lived next door. Poetically, there the paper trail on Gingle’s clan comes to an abrupt end.

Gingle is an effectively unlikely figure through which to highlight the significance of both non-state actors and interstitial nodes such as Hong Kong in the supposedly bifurcated Cold War world. This U.S. veteran with a Cantonese wife in a largely self-governing colony enjoyed unique opportunities to gather, control, and manipulate evolving transpacific networks of people, capital, and information. With aplomb, he hoodwinked the press with his benevolent displays of American patriotism, while defying Washington and Beijing’s directives in the pursuit of illicit profit opportunities. State authorities waged ideological battles and erected legal boundaries, but Gingle appreciated gradations of alignment in his imperial borderland. He was batboy to American troops one day and defied Washington’s embargo the next. While refugees and overseas Chinese communities faced attenuated transpacific corridors and politicized tests of Cold War loyalty,
uniformed symbols of U.S. power were receiving state-sponsored R&R tickets onto Hong Kong’s streets. A privileged and mercenary intermediary such as Gingle worked with both sides for his own advantage. Skirting British colonial oversight and beyond U.S. and P.R.C. jurisdiction, Gingle exploited a political lacuna. He accumulated wealth and notoriety by catering to the U.S. military empire and likely the transnational Chinese communities it threatened.

Gingle’s Kowloon restaurant sat at the heart of a district defined by transnational diversity. Tsim Sha Tsui’s Chinese residents intermixed with British and American tourists and soldiers, Southeast Asian merchants, as well as South Asian tailors and hoteliers—all just two blocks from the old Kowloon Masjid Mosque and a block from the soon-to-materialize “ghetto at the center of the world,” Chungking Mansions. In Cold War Hong Kong as in Washington’s protectorates, U.S. military and commercial populations were dramatically expanding and etching legacies into host and home societies. Only weeks after Gingle died, the U.S.-backed and -staffed Hong Kong Baptist College held its first graduation ceremony, while the next day the U.S. Consul-General opened the colony’s first resettlement community center at Wong Tai Sin, a U.S. donation for World Refugee Year. Months later, U.S. Korean War veterans Robert Miller and Charles Feeney founded DFS Galleria in Hong Kong, today a premier global duty free chain.

U.S. empire was central to Gingle’s postwar opportunities. He used twenty-five years’ of ordinary naval service to sojourn abroad and elected Hong Kong as an opportune platform. While British colonials circumscribed his prewar ambitions, the Pacific War shattered European imperial prestige and cleared his path to new social possibilities. With U.S. prestige at a postwar apex, Washington inserted itself throughout the region’s economic recovery. U.S. policies wrenched Hong Kong away from its traditional entrepôt trade and pushed residents toward export-driven manufacturing, transforming the United States into Hong Kong’s principal export market and by 1963 its leading outside industrial investor. Gingle was not just a witness to these developments,
but a broker and direct beneficiary of them. U.S. power enabled Gingle to escape Japanese
imprisonment, to dismiss colonial conventions, to erect a business that catered to U.S. military
empire, and even to defy Washington’s Cold War agenda. As he said himself:

“Listen, boy…I’m content to stay out here. Where else in this screwball world can I
sit at a crossroads like this, meet all kinds of interesting people every day and get the
chance to shoot the breeze with the kind of characters you see around this joint?... I
wouldn’t trade this deal for anything back in the States.”86

Salty and tenacious, Gingle was a Hong Kong person, an anchor to growing U.S. regional influence,
and eagerly culling his cut from his ‘crossroads.’ He was also a harbinger of the larger U.S. military
presence to come to Hong Kong during the Vietnam War. If he had lived to see it, we can only
imagine the opportunities Gingle would have forged from his landmark front door.

Endnotes:

*I would acknowledge two early inspirations for this paper. One was the user-based historical website, “Gwulo: Old
Hong Kong.” The second was Brian Edgar’s historical blog “In the Dark World’s Fire: Thomas and Evelina Edgar in
Occupied Hong Kong.” Edgar analyzes World War II Hong Kong through his parents’ experiences and has located a
great deal of information on Gingle.

1 Philip Snow, The Fall of Hong Kong: Britain, China and the Japanese Occupation (New Haven: Yale University,
2004), 67.

2 Chi-kwan Mark, Hong Kong and the Cold War: Anglo-American Relations, 1949-1957 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2004).

3 Alan Smart, The Shek Kip Mei Myth: Squatters, Fires and Colonial Rule in Hong Kong, 1950-1963 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong
University Press, 2006); Wong Siu-lun, Emigrant Entrepreneurs: Shanghai Industrialists in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Oxford
University Press, 1988).

4 Mark, Hong Kong and the Cold War, 38.


6 Christina Klein, Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945-1961 (Berkeley, California: University of

8 This paper conceives of the terms “empire” and “imperial” with regard to US power and history as Paul Kramer has discussed: as “a category of analysis, not a kind of entity, some thing to think with more than think about,” in order to facilitate inquires into “the way that power resides in and operates through long-distance connections; the mutual and uneven transformation of societies through those connections; and comparisons between large-scale systems of power and their histories.” See: Paul A. Kramer, “Power and Connection: Imperial Histories of the United States in the World,” *The American Historical Review* 116.5 (December 2011), 1350, 1348-1391.


12 Ibid., 20-21.


16 Snow, *The Fall of Hong Kong*, 3-4.


22 Smith, “The Maryknoll Mission,” June 26, 78R-197, University of Hong Kong Library, Special Collections (HKUSC).

23 Ibid., July 6, 78R-201 and August 5, 78R-205, HKUSC.


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41 “SEAMAN DISCHARGED, Magistrate Dissatisfied With Policeman’s Evidence, ASSAULT ALLEGATION,” SCMP, July 2, 1946, 3.

42 “MARRIAGE NOTICES: Over Two Hundred Posted At Supreme Court,” SCMP, November 22, 1947, 2.


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49 “Mother Tells of Famous Son,” 1.


52 “Mother Tells of Famous Son,” 1.


54 Ibid.

55 Shibusawa, America’s Geisha Ally, 7-9, 112.


57 “Mother Tells of Famous Son,” 1.

58 American Aviation, 16.1 (1952), 60.


60 “PERSONALITIES, Manager of Peninsula Hotel Retiring, Mr. Gerald Matti,” SCMP, October 7, 1947, 2.


63 Ibid., 383-384.

64 Ibid., 385.

65 Ibid., 387.

66 Ibid., 388.

67 Ibid., 388.

68 Mark, Hong Kong and the Cold War.

69 “香港的美國流氓,” Wen Wei Po 文匯報 (WWP), May 12, 1957, 6.


71 Sinn, Pacific Crossing; Madeline Y. Hsu, Dreaming of Gold, Dreaming of Home: Transnationalism and Migration Between the United States and South China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000); also see: Glen D. Peterson, “Socialist China and


75 美嚴禁僑匯, 經港轉港區,” *KSYP*, February 4, 1953, 5.


78 “Copy of an Entry in a Register Kept in the Colony of Hong Kong, In Terms of the Births and Deaths Registration Ordinance (Cap. 174),” June 25, 1960, HKPRO, HKRS 96-1-8344.


80 “In Voluntary Liquidation, Dissolved 31/8/62, Companies File No. 1787, Gingles, Limited,” HKPRO, HKRS 114-6-146.


84 Karel Weiss, ed., Hong Kong Guide, 48 Maps, Comprehensive Street Index, and 44 Photos (Hong Kong: Graphic Press, Ltd., 1955), 195; Foreign Service Despatch, American Consulate General, Hong Kong, July 18, 1960, “Hong Kong Quarterly Economic Summary, Second Quarter 1960,” HKPRO, HKRS 269-1-6
